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ABSTRACT
Earnings are a key firm-performance yardstick for investors, but are not always reliable as they may
be manipulated by managers. In this study, we analyze the relationship between earnings quality
and debt levels of firms in the hospitality sector, using a sample of 642 firms from 26 countries for
the 2002–2016 period. Results show that hospitality firms with higher financial leverage manage less
their earnings. However, this finding holds only for companies in countries with stronger investor
protection. As such, some interesting implications of the leverage-earnings quality relationship are
revealed for investors, lenders, and professionals in the hospitality industry.
Keywords: earnings quality, financial leverage, hospitality industry, international study

Introduction
The hospitality industry is characterized by high levels of competition, risk, capital intensity, and sensitivity to changes in the economy and consumer
spending (Singal, 2015). Due to their geographical
dispersion and their significant investments in tangible assets (land, building, and equipment), hospitality firms usually demand more financial debt than
firms from other industries (Li & Singal, 2019; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2014; Tang & Jang, 2007). Singal
(2015) found that the hospitality and tourism industry shows significant higher leverage ratios than
other industries in a study of the S&P 1500 index
over 21 years. In addition, recent financial data confirmed this distinctive feature of the industry. For

instance, Restaurant & Dining as well as Hotel &
Gaming rank among the top most leveraged sectors
in the United States.1 As a consequence, academic
research has extensively been investigating the
motivations of the hospitality industry to demand
more financial debt (Karadeniz et al., 2009; Pacheco
& Tavares, 2017; Seo et al., 2017; Tang & Jang, 2007;
Upneja & Dalbor, 2001a; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001b;
Upneja & Dalbor, 2001c).
In contrast, the consequences of financial leverage in the hospitality sector have received little academic attention. Various studies have investigated
the association between debt and financial performance using data from Indian hotel chains (Madan,
2007), U.K. hotels (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004), U.S.
restaurants (Jang & Tang, 2009; Tsai & Gu, 2007a;

1

Restaurant & Dining ranks 2nd, Hotel & Gaming ranks 18th, and Recreation ranks 42nd out of 94 sectors. For more details, see
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
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Yoon & Jang, 2005), and U.S. casinos (Seo, 2016; Tsai
& Gu, 2007b). Dewally et al. (2017) documented
the detrimental effect of heavy debt financing by
showing that more leveraged hospitality firms are
less likely to make large investments while Gim et
al. (2019) showed the deterrence effect of financial
leverage on earnings management using a sample of
U.S. restaurants. Thus, the empirical literature on the
consequences of leverage in the hospitality industry remains relatively scant and mainly focused on
economic or financial consequences. To the best of
our knowledge, there are not yet empirical studies
exploring other potential side effects at the international level. In this study, we analyze the impact of
financial leverage on earnings quality across various
countries in the hospitality industry.
It is well documented that insiders (e.g., CEOs or
CFOs) use their discretion to manage accounting
information and, therefore, earnings do not reflect a
company’s true economic reality. Healy and Wahlen
(1999) define earnings management as occurring
when “managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the
underlying economic performance of the company,
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). As earnings
are used by capital providers for investment decisions or performance evaluation, it is particularly
important that earnings reflect the true corporate
performance and are not managed (Dechow, Ge, &
Schrand, 2010; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Despite the
importance of earnings management in mainstream
finance and accounting literature, it has received
scant attention in the hospitality industry, although
extreme examples of earnings management involving hospitality managers captured a great deal of
attention during past decades. In 1998, it was discovered that Cendant Corporation, a marketer and
hotel franchiser, inflated revenues by more than half
a billion USD using accounting techniques, which
led to a $19 billion loss in market value when the
information was released. Before it filed for bankruptcy in 1999, Boston Chicken, a restaurant franchise, restated $300 million in revenues from loans
made to franchisees and start-up costs. In addition,
the company kept losses off the books by parking
transactions at affiliates (Markham, 2015). A last
example is Krispy Kreme, the doughnut maker,
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which had to restate its earnings downward in 2004
because it was found guilty of channel stuffing (the
company was sending twice their usual shipments
to franchisees at the end of each quarter in order to
boost revenues).
The relationship between debt and earnings management is not obvious. On the one hand, leverage
acts as a firm-level disciplinary mechanism on managers, as debtholders usually enhance their monitoring activities (Jensen, 1986). Indeed, creditors
need to make sure debt covenants are respected
and, thus, closely monitor the quality of accounting
information disclosed by managers. On the other
hand, managers may be tempted to manage earnings to limit the pressure coming from debtholders.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued that managers are more likely to use accounting methods that
increase earnings when the debt/equity ratio is high.
Such an association exists because disclosing higher
earnings allows a better negotiation of the quantity
of debt and a decrease of the cost of debt. Furthermore, increased earnings may help avoid breaching
debt covenants. DeAngelo et al. (1994) found that
companies close to violating their covenants adjust
their earnings downward. Given the two potential
opposite directional effects of financial leverage on
earnings quality, there is a need to determine which
one dominates.
When considering the relationship between debt
and earnings management, country-level disciplinary mechanisms, such as the strength of investor legal protection (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al.,
2003), should not to be ignored. In countries with
strong investor protection, litigation risk is higher
(Choi & Wong, 2007; Choi, Kim, et al., 2008; Francis & Wang, 2008), which may prevent managers
from misreporting earnings. Conversely, when
investor protection is weak, managers have more
incentives to distort financial information to acquire
private benefits (Leuz et al., 2003). As a result, it is
worthwhile to investigate the association between
financial leverage and earnings quality in different
institutional contexts.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of
7,194 firm-year observations, covering 15 years
(2002–16) for 642 unique firms in the hospitality
industry from 26 countries. We find two key results.
First, when firms have more financial leverage,
lower earnings management is detected (i.e., higher
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earnings’ quality). This result therefore supports the
idea of effective monitoring carried out by debtholders. Second, the positive association between
financial leverage and earnings quality holds only
in countries with a strong investor protection. This
result suggests that financial leverage has a positive consequence when institutions in place protect shareholders from managers’ misbehavior (i.e.,
earnings management in our case). To ensure the
robustness of our results, we used three proxies for
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991;
Kothari et al., 2005). In addition, we control that our
results are neither driven by the presence of some
specific countries nor by the debt maturity structure. Finally, we rule out the presence of endogeneity arising from the fact that financial leverage does
not vary randomly.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three
respects. First, by analyzing the impact of financial
leverage on financial information quality, we fill a
gap identified by scholars regarding research in hospitality management. As far as debt use is concerned,
Tsai, Pan, and Lee (2011) noted that “. . . there are
few empirical studies of this topic in hospitality
firms. This could be an interesting topic to explore,
contributing to both the hospitality financial management field and mainstream finance literature” (p.
952). In this vein, we no longer consider leverage as
a financial decision or a capital structure parameter to explain but rather envisage leverage as an
explanatory independent variable. We are thus able
to adopt a downstream perspective, which pushes
forward previous upstream literature (Dalbor et
al., 2007; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Pacheco & Tavares,
2017; Seo et al., 2017; Tang & Jang, 2007; Upneja &
Dalbor, 2001a; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001b; Upneja &
Dalbor, 2001c; Upneja & Dalbor, 2009).
Second, our study renews interest in the field of
hospitality research for a somehow neglected topic—
earnings management. Sousa Paiva at al. (2016)
conducted an extensive review of the hospitality
management and accounting literature and concluded that “there is still a lack of empirical research
on financial accounting and (that) scholars should
strive to further the currently limited knowledge in
the area” (p. 88). More specifically, they suggested
paying special attention to the analysis of earnings
management. This emphasis on earnings management is particularly important with regards to the
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contractual role of accounting information for hospitality firms’ capital providers (Jeon et al., 2006).
Third, by adopting a broader perspective compared to previous literature and placing our study in
a global context, we contribute to the literature aiming at understanding the determinants of earnings
quality in the hospitality industry (Gim et al., 2019;
Parte Esteban & Jesus Such Devesa, 2011; Parte
Esteban & Ferrer García, 2014; Seetah, 2017). As
the hospitality and tourism industry is highly internationalized (D’Amore, 1998; Minghetti & Buhalis,
2010; Song et al., 2018), we take this dimension into
account by comparing firms from 26 countries and
by highlighting distinct associations between leverage and earnings management in different institutional contexts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In
the second section, we review the relevant literature
and introduce our research questions. In the third
section, we describe our research design. Results
are presented and discussed in the fourth section.
Finally, we conclude in the last section.

Literature Review and Research Questions
Financial Leverage and Earnings Quality

Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976), research in finance has analyzed
the consequences of financial debt on the value (or
performance) of firms. With the development of the
positive accounting theory by Watts and Zimmerman
(1986), researchers have started investigating the
impact of financial leverage on earnings quality.
The underlying hypothesis is that managers try to
maximize their own interests (i.e., moral hazard)
in a context of asymmetric information, which
notably leads them to manage earnings. Healy and
Wahlen (1999), among others, suggested that managers have various motivations to disclose earnings
that do not reflect the true economic performance
of the firm. First, earnings management may influence the compensation of top executives through
bonuses related to accounting performance. Second,
it may also impact contractual relations with various
stakeholders, especially with debtholders. Third, the
disclosure of managed earnings may affect the valuation of public firms through the revisions of price
targets and recommendations provided by financial
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analysts (e.g., Krispy Kreme had to restate its earnings downward in 2004 because it was discovered
that the company boosted sales artificially at the end
of each quarter to meet earnings forecasts). Finally,
it may also affect the perceptions of regulators and,
therefore, the content of some industry regulations
(e.g., anti-trust regulation).
Regarding the impact of financial leverage on
earnings quality, two opposite arguments are put
forward. On the one hand, debt can act as a disciplinary mechanism on managers as a result of the
increased in-depth monitoring undertaken by debtholders (Jensen, 1986). The latter need to make sure
that debt covenants are respected, which leads them
to closely monitor firm performance using accounting information. Knowing that they are under high
scrutiny, managers are under pressure to provide
earnings that reflect the true economic reality of the
firm.
On the other hand, a positive relationship between
leverage and earnings management can be expected
for two reasons. First, disclosing higher earnings
allows a better negotiation of the quantity of debt, as
well as the cost of debt. Second, it helps to respect the
debt contract and, more specifically, the constraints
resulting from debt covenants (Mohrman, 1996).
In the United States, Sweeney (1994) examined 130
cases of accounting-based covenant violations in
annual reports. She found that earnings tend to be
managed to the upside when firms approach default.
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) studied a sample of
94 firms that reported debt covenant violations in
annual reports. They showed that earnings are managed upward in the year prior to violation and in
the year of violation. DeAngelo et al. (1994) examined 76 distressed companies. Among the troubled
firms that were close to a debt covenant violation,
they expected to find income-increasing actions as
managers have incentives to avoid or defer the costs
of a breach. However, managers of troubled companies appeared to deliberately reduce reported earnings. The authors assumed managers use it as a way
to show creditors their ability and willingness to
seriously streamline operations. Ghosh and Moon
(2010) documented a curvilinear relation between
debt and earnings quality. The relationship is positive at low levels of debt and negative at high debt
levels with an inflection point around 41%. Finally,
Franz et al. (2014) found that firms close to violation
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or in technical default of their debt covenants engage
in higher levels of earnings management than farfrom-violation firms. Overall, the direction and the
significance of the association between leverage and
earnings quality remains an open question.
The global hospitality industry provides a relevant and untapped setting to examine the association between debt and earnings quality. First, due
to their significant investments in tangible assets
(property, plant, and equipment), hospitality firms
demand larger amounts of financial debt than other
industries (Singal, 2015; Li & Singal, 2019), which
has several advantages. Compared to equity, debt
notably allows tax reduction and avoids ownership
structure dilution, knowing that debtholders prefer
financing tangible assets in comparison to intangible
assets that cannot serve as collateral. Based on the
results of a study covering 20 years and more than
3,000 firms across industries, Singal (2015) demonstrated that the hospitality and tourism industry has
structural differences compared to other industries
such as higher capital intensity and higher leverage,
and that these differences provide “. . . support for
future research efforts that may import results from
the broader economy to the special case of Hospitality and Tourism firms” (p. 116). The question of
the validity and the direct import of research results
from mainstream literature arises because substantially higher levels of leverage can potentially alter
the incentives outlined in the above paragraphs, for
example, by exacerbating and amplifying them or,
conversely, by mitigating or even canceling them
through buffering mechanisms.
Second, the literature on earnings management
is relatively scarce in the hospitality industry. Parte
Esteban and Jesus Such Devesa (2011) focused on
reported earnings and demonstrated the importance of reaching certain earnings benchmarks in
the Spanish hotel industry. In a related paper, Parte
Esteban and Ferrer García (2014) examined the
effect of firm characteristics on earnings quality
using a sample of Spanish hotel firms. They found
that some key factors (i.e., internationalization,
location, ownership structure, and audit function)
influence earnings quality in hotel firms. Seetah
(2017) studied the evolution of accounting quality
in the Mauritian hospitality industry. The results
showed that hospitality firms in Mauritius might
have used income-decreasing accruals during the
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financial crisis period and engaged in “big bath”
practices. Finally, Gim et al. (2019) investigated
whether franchise firms manage earnings more
than non-franchise ones using a sample of U.S.
restaurant firms. They showed that franchise firms
manage more earnings during growth phases, and
that leverage is weaker in explaining earnings management for franchise restaurants. Recent empirical
results on earnings management practices in the
hospitality sector are thus lacking. This is all the
more detrimental as this sector is characterized by
high levels of leverage, which can modify relationships between leverage and earnings management
behavior previously observed in studies covering
various industries.
Given the potential double-edged sword effect of
financial debt on earnings management, the high
levels of leverage characterizing the hospitality
industry (Li & Singal, 2019; Serrasqueiro & Nunes,
2014; Tang & Jang, 2007), and the scant research on
earnings management practices in the hospitality
industry, we formulated a first research question:
Research Question 1: How does financial
leverage act on earnings quality in the
hospitality industry?

found that earnings management decreases with the
level of investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces incentives to mask firm
performance. These empirical studies support the
idea that accounting outcomes are closely related to
the institutional context (i.e., macro-mechanism of
management monitoring).
Drawing from past literature, we use one of the
World Bank Group’s governance indicators,2 namely
regulatory quality, which varies across countries
and years, to classify countries depending on their
investor protection strength. This score is defined as
reflecting “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 6).
Given the sharp intrinsic institutional differences
across countries, the role of financial leverage on
earnings quality may actually depend on investor
protection strength. This leads us to formulate a second research question:
Research Question 2: How does investor
protection strength influence the relationship
between financial leverage and earnings
management in the hospitality industry?

Impact of Institutions on Earnings Quality

The hospitality and the tourism industries are highly
internationalized (D’Amore, 1998; Minghetti &
Buhalis, 2010; Song et al., 2018). Companies from
this sector are continuously looking for new markets to increase their market share, and compete
with firms from all over the world. One key factor
characterizing a country’s corporate governance
environment is the legal protection of investors
(La Porta et al., 1998). Investors can be protected
from expropriation through the legal system, which
includes both legal rules and the quality of their
enforcement (La Porta et al., 2000).
Several studies showed that national institutions
matter in terms of earnings quality. In particular,
Ball et al. (2000) showed that earnings are less timely
in incorporating losses in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. Leuz et al. (2003)

Research Design
Sample Selection

Our empirical study is based on a worldwide sample that includes publicly traded firms available on
Datastream from 2002 to 2016, from the “Travel &
Leisure” Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
We started with all firms available in the database
but we dropped firms from sub-industry group
“Airlines”—as we focus on firms in the hospitality
industry—as well as firms with missing data. Our
final sample includes 7,194 firm-year observations
for a total of 642 unique firms in 26 countries.3
Table 1 shows the distribution of observations by
sub-industry and by country. The most represented
sub-industries are Restaurants and Bars (27%), followed by Hotels (24%), Travel and Tourism (21%),

2

For more information: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-methodology.
Although data are provided on Datastream in local currencies by default, they can also be converted into a standard currency. For
our study, all variables were directly retrieved in USD.

3
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Recreational Services (16%), and Gambling (11%).
The two most represented countries are Japan (28%)
and the United States (17%).
Model and Main Variables

To test the impact of financial leverage on earnings
quality, we estimated the following model:
_
+

,

=

0

+

1
,

∗
+

,

(1)

,

In Equation (1), the dependent variable EARNINGS_Mi,t measures earnings management in year
t for firm i. EARNINGS_Mi,t is the absolute value
of abnormal accruals following either Jones (1991)
(EARNINGS_M1i,t); Dechow et al. (1995) (EARNINGS_M2i,t); or Kothari et al. (2005) (EARNINGS_
M3i,t). Higher values of EARNINGS_M indicate
higher earnings management (i.e., lower earnings
quality). More details about the computation of the
three measures of earnings management are provided in Appendix A.

35

The independent variable of interest is LEVERAGE, which we calculated as the ratio of total financial debt to total assets. To answer our first research
question, the coefficient of interest is 1. If 1 is
positive, then higher debt levels are associated with
higher earnings management, which is detrimental to earnings quality. Such result would suggest
that debtholders’ pressure encourages managers to
reduce earnings quality to avoid breach of covenants
or to decrease the cost of debt. However, if the 1
coefficient is negative, it will support an effective
monitoring role by debtholders leading to the disclosure of accounting information of better quality.
To answer our second research question, we use
the same model but we rely on two specifications.
First, we estimate Equation (1) on two distinct subsamples: firms in countries with a strong World Bank
index and firms in countries with a weak World
Bank index. Firms in countries with a score above
the sample median are considered as having a strong
World Bank index while the others have a weak
World Bank index. Given that managers may have
different incentives to distort financial information

Table 1. Distribution of Firm-Year Observations by Sub-Industry and Country
Gambling
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Hotels

Recreational
Services

Restaurants and
Bars

Travel and
Tourism

Total

Australia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Croatia
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Mauritius
Mexico
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
United Kingdom
United States
Vietnam

80
0
36
36
0
0
0
36
22
41
0
0
15
141
0
15
0
15
10
0
32
10
0
52
244
10

56
15
10
8
109
106
0
84
15
53
336
109
0
171
16
33
15
0
24
241
13
0
147
30
110
16

30
6
35
66
22
0
64
38
74
0
73
16
44
331
0
5
0
29
0
0
20
15
35
67
197
7

23
6
26
0
32
10
0
48
0
0
22
33
15
934
0
30
16
15
0
0
0
0
19
197
547
0

52
9
39
0
397
20
0
32
48
72
17
111
27
422
0
0
24
0
0
14
5
30
2
75
101
38

241
36
146
110
560
136
64
238
159
166
448
269
101
1,999
16
83
55
59
34
255
70
55
203
421
1,199
71

Total

795

1,717

1,174

1,973

1,535

7,194
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depending on the strength of investor protection
(Leuz et al., 2003), we focus on the 1 coefficient in
each sub-group. Second, we also estimate Equation
(2) where we include an interaction term between
LEVERAGE and PROTECTION_STRONG. PROTECTION_STRONG is a binary variable taking the
value of one if the country has a score above the
sample median of the World Bank regulatory quality score, and zero otherwise. Our focus is on 3 to
answer our second research question.
_
+
+

3
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2

,

∗
,

+

=

0

+

∗
_

1

,

_
,

+

Results

,

∗
,

that takes the value of one if the firm’s external auditor is a member of one of the Big Four accounting
firms, and zero otherwise. Finally, we include subindustry, country, and year fixed effects to control
for unobservable factors that may impact earnings
quality. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering, consistent with
Petersen (2009) and all variables are winsorized (2%
of the distribution). Appendix B provides detailed
descriptions of all variables used in our models.

,

(2)

Control Variables

In Equations (1) and (2), we include a vector of
control variables that are usually used in the literature. We control for the size of the firm (SIZE)
as Dechow and Dichev (2002) found that accruals
quality is related to firm size. We control for growth
opportunities (GROWTH_OPP) as firms with more
growth opportunities, and thus with greater financing needs, might have stronger incentives to disclose
credible accounting information (Bonetti et al.,
2016). Bédard et al. (2004) found a negative influence of profitability on earnings management. We
include the dummy variable LOSS, taking the value
of one if net income is negative, and zero otherwise.
The impact of accounting standards on the quality of
accounting information has been a source of debate
with mixed results (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). As
our sample is composed of firms that apply IFRS,
US GAAP, or Local GAAP, we control for the potential effect of accounting standards heterogeneity on
earnings management. We use a dummy variable
IFRS that takes the value of one if the firm applies
IFRS, and zero otherwise. In addition, we use a
dummy variable US_GAAP that takes the value of
one if the firm applies US GAAP, and zero otherwise. The literature showed that firms audited by a
Big Four company manage earnings less (DeFond &
Zhang, 2014; Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013). To
control for this effect, we use a dummy variable BIG4

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study for the full sample as well
as for the two sub-samples. Our three alternative
measures of earnings quality produce substantially
similar results. The mean value varies between 0.056
for EARNINGS_M1 and 0.058 for EARNINGS_M3.
The mean value of LEVERAGE is 0.291.4 This value
is in line with Li and Singal (2019) who analyzed
U.S. hospitality data from 1992–2012. Comparing
the two sub-samples, we can see that all variables
(except LOSS) are higher for the strong institutions
sub-sample.
Figure 1 completes our description of financial
leverage. Overall, LEVERAGE has been decreasing until 2013, with a minimum of 27.1% reached
that year. Since then, it has been slightly increasing.
Comparing the two institutional contexts, we can
see that the mean leverage in countries with stronger institutions is almost systematically higher than
in other countries. Moreover, since 2011, opposite
trends have occurred in the two sub-samples, with a
tendency toward more leverage in the strong World
Bank index sub-sample, while the opposite is true
for the weak World Bank index sub-sample. These
contrasting trends over time justify the use of time
fixed effects in our model.
Multivariate Analysis

We report our main findings for the estimation of
Equation (1) in Table 3. In columns (a) to (c) of

4

The mean leverage is relatively comparable across sub-industries and ranges from 0.270 for Gambling to 0.309 for Travel and
Tourism and Recreational Services.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample (N = 7,194)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Median

Max.

EARNINGS_M1
EARNINGS_M2
EARNINGS_M3
LEVERAGE
PROTECTION_STRONG
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4

0.056
0.057
0.058
0.291
0.499
12.383
2.575
0.210
0.204
0.174
0.498

0.053
0.059
0.059
0.225
0.500
1.946
3.922
0.407
0.403
0.379
0.500

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
8.107
−5.976
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.039
0.039
0.039
0.276
0.000
12.271
1.614
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.229
0.311
0.303
0.855
1.000
16.629
22.034
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.057
0.059
0.059
0.308
12.775
2.960
0.208
0.232
0.325
0.543

0.054
0.061
0.060
0.233
2.022
4.575
0.406
0.422
0.469
0.498

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
8.107
−5.976
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.040
0.040
0.041
0.294
12.681
1.836
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000

0.229
0.311
0.303
0.855
16.629
22.034
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.055
0.056
0.056
0.275
11.992
2.192
0.213
0.176
0.023
0.453

0.052
0.058
0.057
0.215
1.784
3.091
0.409
0.381
0.150
0.498

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
8.107
−5.976
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.038
0.038
0.038
0.254
11.958
1.441
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.229
0.311
0.303
0.855
16.629
22.034
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Strong World Bank Index (N = 3,591)
EARNINGS_M1
EARNINGS_M2
EARNINGS_M3
LEVERAGE
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4
Weak World Bank Index (N = 3,603)
EARNINGS_M1
EARNINGS_M2
EARNINGS_M3
LEVERAGE
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4

Note: All variables are defined in Appendix B.

Figure 1. Evolution of the Mean Leverage for the 2002–2016 Period (Strong versus Weak Institutional Context)
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Table 3, the coefficients on LEVERAGE are negative and significant, implying that higher levels of
leverage are associated with lower earnings management (i.e., higher earnings quality). Overall, these
results offer consistent evidence on the firm-level
monitoring role of debtholders over financial information quality through financial leverage. Table 3
also provides evidence on other factors affecting the
propensity of hospitality firms to manage earnings.
Large firms (SIZE) disclose earnings of higher quality, whereas less profitable firms (LOSS) have lower
earnings quality, which is in line with prior studies
(e.g., Bédard et al., 2004).
Table 4 reports the main results to answer our
second research question. Columns (a) to (c) document a significantly negative ߚ3 coefficient on the
interaction term (LEVERAGE * PROTECTION_
STRONG), meaning that the positive impact of
leverage on earnings quality occurs only when institutions are strong.
Next, using the regulatory quality score to split
our sample, we find that the positive and significant
association between leverage and earnings quality

Table 3.

holds only for firms in strong institutional contexts
(columns [d] to [f] of Table 4), which is in line with
the results found in columns (a) to (c). Thus, we support the idea that, in countries with stronger institutions, the relation between leverage and earnings
quality is significant and positive as institutions in
place protect shareholders from managers’ misbehavior (i.e., earnings management in our case). On
the contrary, in columns (g) to (i), the association
between leverage and earnings quality is not significant. In countries with a relatively weak regulatory
environment, debt does not act as an effective mechanism to increase the quality of financial reporting.
It is interesting to note that the association is neither
significant nor positive, which does not support the
hypothesis of opportunism of managers.
Additional Analyses

In this section, we ran additional tests to ensure our
results are not driven by specific countries or by the
debt maturity structure. We also address the endogeneity issue.

The Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management

LEVERAGE
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4
Constant
Country FE
Sub-industry FE
Time FE
Cluster
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic

EARNINGS_M1

EARNINGS_M2

EARNINGS_M3

(a)

(b)

(c)

−0.01***
(−2.59)
−0.01***
(−8.62)
0.00
(1.44)
0.01***
(3.27)
−0.00
(−0.21)
0.00
(0.35)
0.00
(0.76)
0.14***
(10.10)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm
7,194
0.13
9.99***

−0.01**
(−2.14)
−0.01***
(−8.55)
0.00
(1.24)
0.01***
(3.36)
−0.00
(−0.11)
0.00
(0.43)
0.00
(0.69)
0.15***
(10.04)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm
7,194
0.11
9.28***

−0.01**
(−2.26)
−0.01***
(−8.42)
0.00
(1.38)
0.01**
(2.45)
−0.00
(−0.32)
0.00
(0.48)
0.00
(0.67)
0.14***
(10.47)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm
7,194
0.10
8.91***

Note: All variables are defined in Appendix B. OLS regressions with robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 4. The Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management in Different Institutional Contexts
Full Sample

LEVERAGE
PROTECTION_STRONG
LEVERAGE *PROTECTION_STRONG
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4
Constant

Strong World Bank Index

Weak World Bank Index

E_M1

E_M2

E_M3

E_M1

E_M2

E_M3

E_M1

E_M2

E_M3

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f )

(g)

(h)

(i)

−0.00

0.00

0.00

−0.03***

−0.03***

−0.03***

0.00

0.00

0.00

(−0.37)

(0.08)

(0.05)

(−3.60)

(−3.34)

(−3.48)

(0.00)

(0.36)

(0.36)

0.00

0.00

0.00

(0.57)

(0.68)

(0.85)

−0.02**

−0.03**

−0.03**

(−2.27)

(−2.45)

(−2.54)

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

−0.01***

(−8.61)

(−8.53)

(−8.40)

(−7.26)

(−7.34)

(−7.00)

(−5.99)

(−5.68)

(−5.80)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00**

0.00**

0.00**

(1.37)

(1.17)

(1.30)

(0.27)

(0.15)

(0.28)

(2.13)

(2.00)

(2.07)

0.01***

0.01***

0.01**

0.01***

0.01***

0.01***

0.00

0.00

−0.00
(−0.27)

(3.12)

(3.21)

(2.29)

(3.73)

(3.71)

(3.20)

(0.54)

(0.61)

−0.00

−0.00

−0.00

−0.00

−0.00

−0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

(−0.23)

(−0.13)

(−0.34)

(−0.40)

(−0.28)

(−0.57)

(0.19)

(0.26)

(0.22)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.01

−0.03***

−0.03***

−0.03***

(0.27)

(0.33)

(0.38)

(0.99)

(1.09)

(1.29)

(−3.29)

(−3.18)

(−3.16)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

(0.89)

(0.84)

(0.82)

(0.88)

(1.01)

(1.01)

(0.54)

(0.37)

(0.31)

0.14***

0.14***

0.14***

0.13***

0.14***

0.14***

0.17***

0.17***

(9.63)

(9.54)

(8.29)

(8.32)

(8.73)

(10.05)

(10.45)

(10.14)

0.17***
(10.16)

Country FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sub-industry FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cluster

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Firm

Observations

7,194

7,194

7,194

3,591

3,591

3,591

3,603

3,603

3,603

Adjusted R-squared

0.12

0.11

0.10

0.15

0.14

0.13

F-statistic

9.77***

9.27***

8.81***

9.76***

9.25***

8.91***

0.09
27.28***

0.08
25.97***

0.08
25.60***

Note: All variables are defined in Appendix B. EARNINGS_M variables are relabeled E_M for sake of space in this table. OLS regressions with
robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.

Exclusion of Some Countries
To ensure that some countries do not drive our
results, we 1) excluded over-represented countries and 2) over-leveraged countries. As Japan and
the United States represent 45% of our sample, we
excluded these two countries and re-ran our tests.
Our (untabulated) results remain the same. Then,
as Spain and Portugal have the highest leverage levels using the LEVERAGE variable, with 49.7% and
43.8% respectively, we removed observations from
these two countries. Once again, our (untabulated)
results hold.
Debt Maturity Structure
Our results concerning the impact of leverage on
earnings quality may depend upon the debt maturity
structure (the proportion of short- and long-term

jhfm_28-1.indd 39

debt with respect to total assets). We decompose the
variable LEVERAGE into its two components: longterm debt to total assets (LTDTA) and short-term
debt to total assets (STDTA). The coefficients associated with LTDTA are similar to those obtained with
LEVERAGE, while the coefficients on STDTA are
not significant (results not reported). These results
indicate that it is the long-term debt portion of our
leverage measure that positively and significantly
impacts earnings quality.
Endogeneity
One may argue that we face an endogeneity issue
because financial leverage is not randomly determined (i.e., not an exogenous variable). In other
words, firms have various reasons to increase or
decrease their leverage level.
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The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
(not reported) show that we have to reject the null
hypothesis (at the 1% threshold) of our LEVERAGE
variable being exogenous (with the three earnings
management models). To ensure that our results do
not suffer from endogeneity, we consider that the
LEVERAGE variable is determined by firm-level,
industry-level, and country-level factors. As a consequence, we take into account this issue and implement a two-step procedure using a two stage least
squares (2SLS) regression including TANGIBILITY
(the ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets),
and GROWTH_OPP (the market to book ratio) as
instruments. The Sargan-Hansen test (J test) result
is not significant, which confirms the validity of the
instruments. Overall, the additional (untabulated)
results support our main findings regarding our two
research questions, even after correcting for this
endogeneity issue.
Conclusion
Various studies document that firms in the hospitality industry have higher levels of financial leverage than other industries (Li & Singal, 2019; Singal,
2015; Tang & Jang, 2007). While the determinants
of leverage in this industry have been widely studied, the consequences have received little academic
attention. Our study intends to fill this gap and
focuses on the impact of financial leverage on earnings quality in the hospitality industry. Based on
a large sample of firms from 26 countries, we find
that firms with higher financial leverage manage less
their earnings (i.e., disclose earnings of higher quality). More interestingly, we document that this result
is conditional on the institutional context. Using the
regulatory quality score from the World Bank index
as a proxy for the strength of the institutional context, we find that the positive impact of leverage on
earnings quality holds only in countries with strong
institutional context, that is to say when institutions
in place protect shareholders from managers’ misbehavior (i.e., earnings management in our case). We
ran various analyses to make sure that our results
are robust to specific methodological issues.
Our study provides some practical and theoretical implications. From an investor point of view,
investing in firms that disclose earnings of quality
(reflecting the true economic reality of the firm) is an
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important matter. By providing evidence that hospitality firms with high leverage disclose earnings of
better quality if they are incorporated in countries
with strong institutions, we help investors in their
capital allocation process. Investing in hospitality
firms from countries with weak institutions should
be made with caution, and the greater underlying risk
of significant earnings management—potentially
misleading investors—has to be accounted for.
Next, this study provides useful insights to top
managers and boards of directors by documenting
that using financial debt has some positive consequences in terms of earnings quality in countries
with stronger investor protection. Thus, in line with
Jensen (1986), engaging firms to finance projects
with debt instead of equity may improve the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests. It is
well-known that financial leverage reduces the average cost of capital because of a tax advantage, avoids
dilution of ownership structure, and puts pressure
on managers that may be tempted to invest in negative net present values projects. Our results support
the idea that more debt also reduces the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers by encouraging the latter to disclose earnings of
higher quality.
Moreover, it is crucial to place our research in a
more general context concerning the transformation
of the hospitality industry with respect to the assetlight strategy, which is generally associated with a
decrease in tangible assets and debt levels (Sohn
et al., 2014). Assuming that hospitality firms will
continue their shift toward more “asset-lightness,”
this will result in lower proportions of fixed asset
in the balance sheets, and most probably in lower
debt levels. Indeed, various studies document that
firms with more tangible assets can borrow more
because their fixed assets can serve as collateral, and
at a lower cost (e.g. Norton, 1995; Rajan & Zingales,
1995; Sheel, 1994; Tang & Jang, 2007). Reducing the
proportion of fixed assets might thus reduce debt
financing opportunities and the underlying benefits. Meanwhile, there is a tendency toward more
financial leverage in some sub-industries (Li & Singal, 2019). In consequence, these trends are likely to
indirectly increase or decrease the quality of financial information disclosed by hospitality companies.
Our study is not without limitations. First of all,
we solely focus on publicly traded firms, which limits
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the generalizability of our results to private firms.
Moreover, running a large-scale hospitality-focused
study inevitably leads to pooling together subindustries with different characteristics. Although we
included sub-industry fixed effects in our tests on top
of controlling for various characteristics, the usefulness of the results might be limited for specific subindustries. Second, we only address the quality of
accounting information through earnings management. However, other characteristics of accounting
information may be impacted by financial leverage,
like earnings persistence (e.g. Jeon et al., 2006) or
earnings forecasts (e.g. Smeral, 2016). Third, investigating how the asset-light strategy influences leverage
in an international context, and as a result earnings
quality, might also be an interesting direction for
future research with access to the relevant data. In
particular, as all sub-industries in the hospitality
sector are not subject to the same trends and modes
of operation (e.g., franchise, management contract,
etc.), comparisons between sub-sectors and modes
of operations would provide further insight into the
results. Thus, more research is definitively needed on
financial information in the hospitality industry.
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In the three models,
, is the total accruals of firm i in year t, defined as net income before
extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. In the Jones (1991) model, total accruals are
explained by the change in sales (∆S , ), and property, plant, and equipment (
, ). All variables
included in the model are scaled by lagged total
assets ( , −1) to reduce heteroscedasticity:

The Dechow et al. (1995) model expands the
Jones model by removing the variation in accounts
receivable (∆ , ) from variation in sales:

Appendix A. Earnings Management Models
To ensure the robustness of our results, we use
three measures of earnings management following
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and Kothari et
al. (2005). In the three models, the abnormal (discretionary) component of accruals ( , ) provides
indirect evidence of earnings management behavior
and, thus, of lower earnings quality.

The Kothari et al. (2005) model includes the
lagged return on assets (
, −1):

Appendix B. List of Variables and Measurements
Appendix Table 1.

Measure

EARNINGS_M1
EARNINGS_M2
EARNINGS_M3
LEVERAGE
PROTECTION_STRONG

Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Jones (1991) model
Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) model
Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Kothari et al. (2005) model
(Long-term debt + Short-term debt) / Total assets
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the score from the World Bank index (regulatory quality) for the corresponding
country-year is greater than the sample median, 0 otherwise
Natural logarithm of total assets
Market value of equity / Book value of equity
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss in the current year, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm applies IFRS, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm applies US GAAP, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s external auditor is a Big Four company, 0 otherwise

SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
LOSS
IFRS
US_GAAP
BIG4
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